APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates both getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount in InternalUserController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so both endpoints are reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can POST to /api/v1/internal/getUserHistories to enumerate the accounts sitting in the 30-day cooling-off period that follows a deletion request, then POST to /api/v1/internal/users/{userId}/close for each one. The closure path clears the account's email address, phone number and nickname, cancels its space subscriptions, removes its space memberships and deletes its OAuth bindings, so the cooling-off window that exists to let a user reverse a deletion request is bypassed and the account cannot be recovered.

APITable through version 1.13.0-beta.1 contains a critical missing authentication vulnerability in its InternalUserController. Two endpoints, getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount, are annotated with requiredLogin=false, allowing unauthenticated access. The nginx gateway proxies all /api requests to the backend, making these endpoints reachable by any unauthenticated client. An attacker can first enumerate accounts in the 30-day deletion cooling-off period, then permanently close those accounts by calling the closure endpoint. The account closure process irreversibly clears email addresses, phone numbers, nicknames, cancels space subscriptions, removes space memberships, and deletes OAuth bindings. This effectively bypasses the recovery window designed to let users reverse deletion requests, making account recovery impossible. The vulnerability poses a significant risk of mass account destruction by any unauthenticated attacker with network access to the gateway.