gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Rust crates gix (<= 0.72.0) and gix-validate (<= 0.10.0), collectively known as gitoxide. The submodule name validation in gix-validate only checks for the first occurrence of '..' using name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names like 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check. Additionally, this validation is never called in production code paths, making it effectively useless. A secondary flaw in Submodule::open() causes the parent repository's full trust level (Trust::Full) to be inherited by submodules without re-verifying ownership, bypassing safe-directory protections. An attacker can exploit these flaws by crafting a malicious .gitmodules file, causing victim tools built on gitoxide to read arbitrary git repository configurations, potentially exposing embedded credentials. The vulnerabilities are fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.