gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Rust crates gix (<=0.72.0) and gix-validate (<=0.10.0), part of the gitoxide project. The submodule name validation in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' using name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names like 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check. Additionally, this validation is never invoked in production code paths. A second flaw in Submodule::open() causes trust inheritance, where the parent repository's full trust level is cloned and ownership verification is skipped. An attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file to trick victim tools built on gitoxide into reading arbitrary git repository configurations, including embedded credentials, with full trust. This bypasses safe-directory protections. The vulnerabilities are fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.