Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. In 3e595f3 and prior, when a streaming proposal is funded, the cluster of streaming contracts moves real pool funds into the proposal's StreamingEscrow to back the Superfluid constant flow agreement (the CFA deposit, plus a 0.5 percent margin). cancelProposal then zeroes the escrow's GDA member units but never reclaims that parked balance, and the permissionless claim() forwards the escrow's entire balance, including the pool funded buffer, to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter. The only path that returns escrow funds to the pool is drainToStrategy, which is onlyStrategy and is reached solely from the dispute reject ruling, never from cancel or natural completion. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.

CVE-2026-55658 affects Gardens v2, a modular governance framework for decentralized communities managing governance pools. In commit 3e595f3 and prior, a critical vulnerability exists in the handling of streaming proposal funds. When a streaming proposal is funded, real pool funds are moved into a StreamingEscrow contract to back a Superfluid constant flow agreement. The cancelProposal function zeroes the escrow's GDA member units but fails to reclaim the parked balance. A permissionless claim() function then forwards the entire escrow balance, including the pool-funded buffer, to the beneficiary — who is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter themselves. The only mechanism to return escrow funds to the pool (drainToStrategy) is restricted to the strategy role and is only triggered via dispute reject rulings, never through cancel or natural proposal completion. This creates a pathway for malicious or opportunistic proposal submitters to drain pool funds. No patches are publicly available at the time of publication.